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Are Disagreements about Taste Possible? 
A Discussion of Kant's Antinomy of Taste 
David Stern 
ARE DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT TASTE POSSIBLE? Nothing easier 
or more common, you might think. I like chocolate ice-cream, you prefer 
coffee. But do we really disagree? We can argue for our tastes. You might 
appeal to coffee's exquisite counterpoint of bitterness and sweetness; I 
might counter by invoking the aphrodisiac warmth of good chocolate, 
more bittersweet than any coffee. But defending our preferences is only 
likely to intensify the controversy; it is hardly realistic to expect us to 
definitively resolve such differences. Can there be genuine disagreement as 
apart from opposed preferences, when there is no possibility of rational 
agreement? This train of thought suggests two diametrically opposed rea 
sons for thinking we cannot disagr?e about our tastes. On the one hand, if 
taste is purely a matter of subjective preference, then there is nothing to 
disagree about. On the other hand, if there is an objective matter of fact at 
issue, the problem is that a rational resolution seems impossible. 
The dichotomy I have just sketched may appear contrived, if not ludi 
crous. But while the illustration is mine, the dichotomy is Kant's. It arises 
at the end of his discussion of aesthetic judgment in the first part of the Cri 
tique of Judgment. There, Kant denies that there is an autonomous aes 
thetic sense or faculty of aesthetic judgment. Instead, he argues that taste, 
the ability to discriminate aesthetic value, arises out of the interplay of the 
imagination and the understanding. Thus, taste is neither relegated nor 
promoted to some special corner of the mind, but involves the very capaci 
ties which make us reasoning, experiencing, and embodied beings. Taste 
has both a subjective aspect, in that it consists in a felt response to the aes 
thetic qualities of an object, and an objective aspect, in that we can give 
reasons for our aesthetic judgments. Kant's analysis of aesthetic judgment 
leads to a "dialectic," a conflict between two incompatible principles 
which raises the question whether the power of judgment "is lawful and 
hence also whether such a power is intrinsically possible" (210) and so 
threatens his whole project. This problem takes the form of an antinomy, 
a pair of incompatible theses which both seem true. 
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Kant illustrates these opposed principles by appealing to what he calls 
two 
"commonplaces about taste." The first, "everyone has his own taste," is 
connected with the subjectivist side of our dichotomy: "the basis deter 
mining a judgment of taste is merely subjective (gratification or pain), and 
. . . such judgments have no right to other people's necessary assent" 
(210). The second, "There is no disputing about taste," is connected with the 
opposed position, which holds that even if there is a right answer to a 
question of taste, one can never prove it. For it "amounts to saying that, 
even though the basis determining a judgment of taste may be objective, 
that basis still cannot be brought to determinate concepts" (210), that is, 
concepts that determine an object. In effect, Kant regards these common 
places?that we disagree about taste, yet there can be no genuine disputes 
about taste ?as givens, and then strives to find a middle way between 
them. 
Kant articulates the differences between these positions by distinguish 
ing two types of disagreement, "disputing" (disputieren) and "quarreling" 
(streiten). A "dispute" is a disagreement which we can settle rationally, by 
a proof based on objective concepts. A "quarrel" is a disagreement in 
which the participants have opposed views, but there are no objective con 
cepts and so no method for principled resolution. This terminology is used 
to 
explain how both of Kant's "commonplaces about taste" have the same 
motivation. They are diametrically opposed responses to the same prob 
lem: the recognition that a dispute, the rational resolution of a disagree 
ment over taste, is impossible. The first, subjectivist, response is to hold 
that differences of taste are merely differences of subjective preference, and 
so maintain that there is nothing which could form the basis for a quarrel, 
let alone a dispute. The second response is to hold that even though one 
can't dispute taste, differences over taste are objective differences, and so 
quarrels about taste are possible. As a result, the point at issue between 
these positions is whether one can quarrel about taste, that is, argue for 
one's tastes, or as Kant puts it, "lay claim to other people's necessary assent 
to one's judgment" (211). The first position denies that one can quarrel 
about taste; the second insists that one can. This is the basis for Kant's 
antinomy of taste, which is phrased in terms of a disagreement over 
whether judgments of taste are based on concepts, a precondition for 
reasoned disagreement. The subjectivist thesis is that "a judgment of taste 
is not based on concepts; for otherwise one could dispute about it (decide 
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by means of proofs)" (211). The antithesis is that a "judgment of taste is 
based on concepts; for otherwise, regardless of the variation among such 
judgments, one could not even so much as quarrel about them (lay claim 
to other people's necessary assent to one's judgment)" (211). 
Kant describes the antinomy as a difference between the empiricist view 
that taste is determined by experience, and the rationalist view that we can 
reason about a standard of taste a priori (220ff.), echoing the contrast 
between those who "found morality on sentiment" and those who base 
morality on reason drawn in Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste." 
Each side in this controversy, as is often the case where scepticism is at 
issue, gains much of its plausibility by playing up the implausibility of the 
extremes which the other side can lead to. The proponent of the antithesis 
can insist that there is more to judgments of taste than Humean senti 
ment, the empirical phenomena of approval and disapproval and their 
expression. The defender of the thesis can respond that the "necessary 
assent" which pompous people invoke when appraising aesthetic objects is 
worthless if it can never be backed up by proof. 
To see how Kant resolves this antinomy, we must look at his account of 
the role of concepts in judgments of taste. In Kant's view, a judgment of 
taste is always based on an individual's subjective response to some specific 
experienced object, such as a picture or a landscape. The judgment 
? 
"That's beautiful"?is an articulation of the individual's aesthetic response, 
which is a certain sort of feeling of pleasure. Such judgments, Kant holds, 
do not employ "determinate concepts." If, however, I judge that I see a 
painting composed of red, yellow, blue, black, grey, and white rectangles 
framed by a black grid, I am applying determinate concepts, for there are 
objective procedures for establishing the applicability of the concepts in 
question. In this case, the truth or falsity of the judgment in question can 
be objectively ascertained by any competent individual. But because we do 
not have such determinate concepts in the case of aesthetic judgment, we 
are unable to arrive at a comparable consensus. Kant then uses the notion 
of an "indeterminate concept" to present his view of aesthetic judgment as 
one which successfully mediates between two extreme positions which 
comprise the antinomy. He observes that judgments of taste are, in a cru 
cial respect, very different from a simple judgment that something is 
agreeable. In saying that I like something, or as he puts it, that I find it 
agreeable, I simply express my own personal response to that thing. On 
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the other hand, when I say it's beautiful, I not only express my pleasure, I 
also maintain that everyone else should feel the same; in Kant's words, my 
judgment "lay[s] claim to necessary validity for everyone" (212). This 
claim to necessity is a sure sign that concepts play a role in the judgment. 
But this is immediately counterbalanced by the claim that the concepts in 
question cannot be determined?and so they do not permit a proof that 
the object is beautiful or not. And that, in outline, is the approach Kant 
adopts: aesthetic judgments are conceptual, and so can claim universal 
validity, but the concepts are intrinsically indeterminate, and so we cannot 
settle aesthetic disputes. 
Kant also tries to explain how this indeterminacy arises. He maintains 
that our aesthetic concepts depend on the "transcendental concept of the 
supersensible" (212), the "general basis of nature's subjective purposive 
ness for our power of judgment," characterizing it as a "concept [that] 
does not allow us to cognize and prove anything concerning the object 
because it is intrinsically indeterminable and inadequate for cognition" 
(213). This invocation of a necessarily ineffable non-entity, the indeter 
minable 
"supersensible" is supposed to solve the antinomy, by explaining 
how both thesis and antithesis can be true: a judgment of taste is not based 
on determinate concepts, (revised version of the thesis), but it is based on an 
indeterminate concept, namely the supersensible substrate of phenomena 
(revised version of the antithesis). Kant adds that no further explanation of 
the antinomy is possible, as the supersensible lies beyond the limits of what 
we can know. Any such explanation would "surpass our cognitive 
power-Eliminating this conflict between the claims and counterclaims 
of taste is the best we can do" (213). 
Let's return to the question whether disagreements about taste are pos 
sible. We can see that much depends on what you mean by "disagree 
ment"?a dispute, a quarrel, or a brawl. Obviously brawls are possible. 
Obviously disputes, in Kant's sense of the term, are impossible?they 
would require a rational aesthetics beyond the reach of mere mortals. Kant 
is convinced that quarrels are possible, but that they are only possible if we 
believe in a noumenal (unknowable) rational aesthetics, even though we 
can't possibly know anything about noumena. This, I think, is a terrible 
position. It requires that we deny pluralism in aesthetics, and so rules out 
the possibility that there may be many different, equally valuable sensibili 
ties; it requires that we place too high a value on convergence and does not 
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allow us to celebrate diversity; and it backs this up by an obscurantist 
appeal to a ghost which though we know it can never be realized, haunts 
us with its demands. The supersensible is a philosophical myth which 
allows Kant to preserve his conviction that there is a fact of the matter 
about taste despite his inability to find a good argument for it: he kicks it 
out of the world we know only to reinstate it as a ghostly noumenal 
presence. 
It is striking that Kant invokes the supersensible quite abruptly in his 
solution to the antinomy. However, in a subsequent comment he explains 
that this antinomy, like the parallel antinomies in the first and second Cri 
tiques, is valuable for forcing us to abandon the belief that we see things in 
themselves. Instead, we realize that we must treat what we see as mere 
phenomena arising out of something which we cannot adequately grasp, 
an 
"intelligible substrate (something supersensible, the concept of which is 
only an idea and precludes cognition proper)" (218). The point of this 
experience of moving to the very limits of intelligibility is to enable reason 
to 
recognize its own limitations, to make way for faith in something that 
cannot be fully understood. Here we can see a close connection with one 
of the central themes of Kant's philosophy: the supersensible being that 
Kant invokes is God. Kant's God is not known on the basis of reason; 
instead, reason is limited in a way that leads to faith. 
A second direction in which discussion might move is beyond Kant's 
own concerns: we 
might consider how to develop Kant's ideas about 
"indeterminate concepts" in aesthetics quite apart from his own meta 
physical system. What, in other words, is missing from Kant's account? 
To my mind, Kant's primary deficiency is that he rules out the role of 
specific communities in forming aesthetic judgment, or other forms of aes 
thetic diversity. But even if we are convinced that we need to take the role 
of community and history seriously in the variety of our responses to the 
objects we find and make, and thus examine the ideological dimension of 
even the 
"purest" aesthetics, we can still learn much from Kant. His 
emphasis on the particular aesthetic judgment, and his insistence that 
"there neither is, nor can be, a science of the beautiful, and a judgment of 
taste cannot be determined by means of principles" (230) can still provide 
us with a valuable point of departure. In particular, I would stress a 
passage in which Kant emphasizes the indispensable role of practice and 
communication in developing one's aesthetic sense, a capability he regards 
as constitutive of our very humanity: 
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It seems that for all fine art, insofar as we aim at its highest 
degree of perfection, the propaedeutic does not consist in fol 
lowing precepts but in cultivating our mental powers by 
exposing ourself beforehand to what we call the humaniora; 
they are called that presumably because humanity [Humanit?t] 
means both the universal feeling of sympathy, and the ability to 
engage universally in very intimate communication. When these 
two qualities are combined, they constitute the sociability that 
befits our humanity [Menschheit] and distinguishes it from the 
limitations characteristic of animals. (231) 
The humanities can still learn much from Kant's work, even though two 
hundred years later, we may need to develop a broader sense of "human 
ity" than can be found in Kant. In retrospect, Kant's antinomy cries out 
for both synthesis and deconstruction. It asks to be read, it asks us to ex 
plain the gap between the initial opposition and the transcendental idealist 
solution, both because it isn't a solution, and because he really doesn't do 
enough to justify, explain, or locate it. 
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